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In this Comment, we reexamine the security of phase-encoded quantum private query (QPQ). We find
that the current phase-encoded QPQ protocols, including their applications, are vulnerable to a probabilistic
entangle-and-measure attack performed by the owner of the database. Furthermore, we discuss how to overcome
this security loophole and present an improved cheat-sensitive QPQ protocol without losing the good features
of the original protocol.
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I. INTRODUCTION

II. REVIEW OF PHASE-ENCODED QPQ

With the rapid development of quantum computations and
quantum communications, classical cryptography, including
symmetric cryptography and public key cryptography, is
facing enormous threats and challenges. On the other hand,
quantum cryptography brings a new dawn for information
security research.
Quantum cryptography can provide the unconditional security, which is guaranteed by physical principles of quantum
mechanics. Compared to classical cryptography, the most important advantage is that an eavesdropper or attacker can easily
be detected by using the characteristics of quantum mechanics.
Private query is a special privacy-preserving problem [1,2],
which involves two parties, a user Alice and a server Bob where
Alice wants to obtain an element of the database privately held
by Bob, but she does not want Bob to know which element
she is interested in, and in turn, Bob wants to limit Alice’s
information about the other elements, that is, Alice cannot get
other elements except the one she wanted in the database.
In 2007, Giovannetti et al. [3] first presented a cheatsensitive quantum protocol to solve the private query problem.
Compared to the classical related protocols, their quantum
private query (QPQ) protocol achieves an exponential reduction both in communication complexity and in computational
complexity. In 2011, Olejnik further proposed a phase-encoded
QPQ protocol [4]. In comparison with the original QPQ
protocol [3], the phase-encoded QPQ protocol displays two
prominent advantages: lower communication cost and better
implementability. Due to its good properties, there are lots
of important applications of phase-encoded QPQ especially
in some privacy-preserving settings, such as oblivious setmember decision [5], private set intersection [6], secure data
mining [7], and so on.
However, in this Comment, we find a serious security
problem for all current quantum protocols based on the
phase-encoded QPQ, that is, these protocols are vulnerable to
a probabilistic entangle-and-measure attack performed by the
owner of the database. Furthermore, we present improvements
to overcome this security loophole.

Here, we simply review the original phase-encoded QPQ
presented by Olejnik [4]. Suppose that Bob privately owns
an N-element database: d(i) for i = 0 to N − 1, where d(i) ∈
{0,1} and Alice wants to obtain the ith element of the database.
√
For this, Alice sends a single query state |ψ = |0+|i
to Bob
2
through a quantum channel. Then Bob performs an oracle operator U on the query state |ψ where the operator U is defined by
⎛
⎞
(−1)d(0)
⎜
⎟
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⎜
⎟
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⎝
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√
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|0 + (−1)d(i) |i
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.
√
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Clearly,
|ϕ =

√ ,
2
|0−|i
√ ,
2

if d(i) = 0,
if d(i) = 1.

(3)

(4)

Furthermore, Bob sends state |ϕ back to Alice. Finally,
Alice gets the ith element d(i) by distinguishing whether the
√
√ .
returned state is |0+|i
or |0−|i
2
2
III. ANALYSIS OF PHASE-ENCODED QPQ

Since Alice knows the value i, she can distinguish between
√
and |0−|i
by performing a von Neumann measurement
2
where the measurement operators are defined by
|0+|i
√
2

P+i = 12 (|00| + |0i| + |i0| + |ii|),

(5)

P−i = 12 (|00| − |0i| − |i0| + |ii|),

(6)

Obviously, the two measurement operators satisfy the
completeness and the orthogonality, i.e.,
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P+i + P−i = I,

(7)

P+i P−i = 0.

(8)
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von Neumann measurement {P+i ,P−i } on A. Then, it will get

Furthermore, we define
|0 + |i
,
√
2
|0 − |i
|−i = √
,
2

|+i =

(9)

p+i = AB φ|P+i ⊗ I |φAB = 12 ,

(18)

(10)

p−i = AB φ|P−i ⊗ I |φAB = 12 ,

(19)

|f (0)B + |f (i)B
|0A + |iA
P+i ⊗ I |φAB
⊗
, (20)
=
√
√
√
p+i
2
2
|f (0)B − |f (i)B
|0A − |iA
P−i ⊗ I |φAB
⊗
. (21)
=
√
√
√
p−i
2
2

Then, it will get the following equations:
+i|P+i |+i = 1,

(11)

−i|P+i |−i = 0,

(12)

+i|P−i |+i = 0,

(13)

−i|P−i |−i = 1.

(14)

Therefore, Alice can perfectly distinguish two possible
returned states (i.e., |+i and |−i). That is, the phase-encoded
QPQ is correct.
In Ref. [4], the author pointed out that, if a dishonest Bob
performs an intercept-and-resend attack, he might eventually
succeed but not with more than a 50% chance. However, the
author did not consider more attacks performed by Bob. In
the following section, we will discuss a more complicated
entangle-and-measure attack by a dishonest Bob as follows:
After receiving the query state, Bob first prepares an
ancillary state |0B and then performs an oracle operator Ũf
on the query state |A and the ancillary state |0B where the
oracle operator Ũf is defined by [8,9]
Ũf : |x|y → |x|y ⊕ f (x).

(15)

Clearly, we can get
y|x|Ũf+ Ũf |x|y = f (x) ⊕ y|x | x|y ⊕ f (x) = 1.
(16)
That is, Ũf+ Ũ = I , which satisfies the unitarity.
So,
Ũf |ψA |0B = Ũf

|0A + |iA
|0B
√
2

Ũf |0A |0B + Ũf |iA |0B
√
2
|0A |0 ⊕ f (0)B + |iA |0 ⊕ f (i)B
=
√
2
|0A |f (0)B + |iA |f (i)B
.
(17)
=
√
2

=

Please note that here f (·) is a classical function, which
is usually defined as a one-to-one mapping, e.g., f (i) = i in
order to later steal the maximum possible information.
Furthermore, we call the resultant state |AB , i.e.,
A |f (i)B
|AB = |0A |f (0)B√+|i
, where the subscripts A and B
2
denote quantum subsystems prepared originally by Alice and
Bob, respectively. Then Bob sends the query subsystem A
back to Alice and keeps the ancillary subsystem B in hand.
After receiving the returned subsystem A, Alice performs a

After the measurement the whole quantum system AB will
⊗I |φAB
⊗I |φAB
be collapsed into state P+i √
or P−i √
with the probpi+
pi−
ability of p+i or p−i , respectively. That is, Alice will get the
A
A
measured result |0A√+|i
or |0A√−|i
with the same probability
2
2
of 12 , respectively. However, in current phase-encoded QPQ
protocols [4–6] as long as the returned system is in state
|0A +|iA
A
√
or |0A√−|i
, Alice will believe that Bob is honest.
2
2
By Eqs. (20) and (21), Bob can steal the partial information
about Alice’s secret i [i.e., f (i)] with the probability of 12
by measuring his ancillary system B afterwards, whereas
Alice cannot find his cheat. For example, if f (i) = i, then
f (0) = f (i) (i = 0). Accordingly, Bob can fully steal Alice’s
secret i with the probability of 12 , but Alice cannot detect
his eavesdropping. Therefore, the current phase-encoded QPQ
protocols are vulnerable to the probabilistic entangle-andmeasure attack by dishonest Bob. Please note that the original
QPQ [3] is not phase encoded, so Alice can easily find this
√ |A(j ) ) rather
cheat if she gets an orthogonal state (i.e, |0|A(0)−|j
2

√ |A(j ) ). That is, the
than the real returned state (i.e, |0|A(0)+|j
2
original QPQ protocol can resist this attack [10].
In order to resist this attack, Alice can send two or more
same query states to Bob and further checks whether all
√
returned states are identical, that is, they are all in |0+|i
2

√ ). If they are not same, it will show that Bob is
(or |0−|i
2
dishonest. However, if Alice sends multiple same query states
to Bob, on the other hand, Bob can successfully perform the
intercept-and-resend attack with more than a 50% chance.
For example, if Alice sends two same query states (i.e.,
√ , |0−|i
√ }) to Bob, then Bob can successfully steal Alice’s
{ |0+|i
2
2

secret i with 34 probability by directly measuring two query
states on the computational basis.
In order to overcome this difficulty, we further present an
improved QPQ protocol in which Alice still sends multiple
same query systems to Bob, but these query systems are all
in mixed states not pure states such that it can fully resist the
intercept-and-resend attack performed by Bob.
IV. IMPROVED QPQ PROTOCOL

Suppose that Bob owns a private N-element database:
{d(0),d(1), . . . ,d(i), . . . ,d(N − 1)}, where N = 2n and
d(i) ∈ {0,1} and Alice wants to obtain the ith element of the
database but not revealing the secret i. The improved protocol
is described in detail as follows:
√
Step 1. Alice first prepares two n-qubit states |0+|i
and |0.
2
Then, Alice generates a 2n-qubit entangled state by sending
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the two n-qubit states through n controlled-NOT (CNOT) gates
where each qubit of the first state is the control qubit and each
qubit of the second state is the corresponding target qubit. After
performing all CNOT gates, the 2n qubits will be entangled as
the following state |ψ1 :
|ψ1  = CNOT(1,n + 1) ⊗ CNOT(2,n + 2) ⊗ CNOT(n,2n)
×

|0|0 + |i|i
|0 + |i
⊗ |0 =
.
√
√
2
2

(23)

where the subscripts hj and tj denote different registers for
j = 1,2, respectively. Subsequently, Alice performs a test
procedure to check Bob’s honesty as follows:
(5.1) Alice again applies n CNOT gates to each 2n qubit
where each qubit in register tj is the control qubit and each
qubit in register hj is the corresponding target qubit. Thus, we
get
⊗n

CNOT

= |0hj

|0hj |0tj + (−1)d(i) |ihj |itj
√
2
|0tj + (−1)
√
2

d(i)

|itj

(5.2) Then, Alice measures the states in registers h1 and h2
on the computational basis, respectively, and further checks
whether both measured results are |0. If the measured results
are not |0, she will terminate this protocol; otherwise she will
continue to the next step.
(5.3) Furthermore, Alice measures the states in registers t1
and t2 by a von Neumann measurement {P+i ,P+i }, respectively, and further checks whether they are in
|0tj −|itj
√
2

|0tj +|itj
√
2

or

, but it requires that two measured results are identical.
If Alice finds a cheat from Bob, she will terminate this protocol;
otherwise she will continue to the next step.
Step 6. After completing the honesty test, Alice extracts
out the phase information d(i) from register t1 or t2 by
distinguishing between
if it is in state

|0tj +|itj
√
2

|0tj +|itj
√
2

and

|0tj −|itj
√
2

, that is, d(i) = 0

and d(i) = 1 otherwise.

Q hj

Rtj

|0
|i

|0
|i

|0
|0
|i

|0+|i
√
2

Pass Step 5.2 Pass Step 5.3 Fully pass Step 5
Yes
No
Yes
Yes/no

No
No
No
No

No
No
No
No

Note. Qtj , Qhj and Rtj denote the possible states measured by Bob
in register tj , the collapsed state in register hj , and the possible state
returned by Bob in register tj , respectively.

V. ANALYSIS OF THE IMPROVED QPQ PROTOCOL

The correctness proof of our improved QPQ protocol is
same as that of the original phase-encoded QPQ protocol [4].
So we mainly focus on the security of our improved QPQ
protocol in the following section.

A. Alice’s privacy

Similarly, Alice’s privacy is based on the fact that Bob is
not able to distinguish the states of the query subsystems (i.e.,
registers t1 and t2 ) due to two basic quantum principles: the
no-cloning theorem and the Heisenberg uncertainty principle.
First, Bob cannot copy the unknown state in register tj because
of the no-cloning theorem. Second, Bob cannot yet measure
it to directly extract Alice’s secret information, and otherwise
his dishonesty will be found by Alice in a later test procedure.
Unlike these cheat-sensitive QPQ protocols [3,4] in which
Bob can also successfully pass Alice’s honesty test with
the probability of 12 if he performs an intercept-and-resend
attack, our improved QPQ protocol can fully resist this
attack. In our improved protocol, the query subsystem is
entangled with another ancillary subsystem held in Alice’s
|0h |0t +|ih |it

(24)

.

Qt j

(22)

Step 2. Furthermore, Alice prepares another 2n-qubit state
√
|ψ2  = |0|0+|i|i
where the preparation process is the same as
2
that of Step 1.
Step 3. Alice uses four registers h1 , h2 , t1 , and t2 to store
the 4n qubits where register hj contains the first n qubits of
|ψj  and accordingly register tj contains the second n qubits
for j = 1,2. Then Alice sends registers t1 and t2 to Bob while
she keeps registers h1 and h2 in hand.
Step 4. After receiving registers t1 and t2 , Bob applies
an oracle operator U to the states in registers t1 and t2 ,
respectively, and then sends them back to Alice where the
operator U is defined by Eqs. (1)–(3).
Step 5. After receiving the returned registers t1 and t2 , each
integrated quantum system in Alice’s hands should be in the
following state:
|0hj |0tj + (−1)d(i) |ihj |itj
,
√
2

TABLE I. The different results of Bob’s performing the measureand-resend attack.

j
j
j
j
√
), and both subsystems will be
hands (i.e.,
2
checked in a later honesty test, respectively. If Bob measures
the query subsystem in register tj , which is a mixed state

|0t 0|+|it i|

ρtj = j 2 j before Step 5, it will certainly disentangle
the entanglement of two subsystems hj and tj . Accordingly,
Alice’s measured results in her honesty test will not be both
|0t ±|it

|0hj and j√2 j , which is shown in Table I in detail. From
Table I, we can easily deduce that Bob cannot pass two honesty
tests successfully if he performs the intercept-and-resend
attack.
Furthermore, if Bob performs an entangle- and-measure
attack described above in Sec. III, the returned quantum
subsystems in register tj will still be in a mixed state (i.e,
|0t 0|+|it i|

ρtj = j 2 j ) even after Step 5.2, not a pure state, due to
the ancillary system of Bob [please see Eqs. (17)–(21)]. Then,
|0t +|it

|0t −|it

in Step 5.3, Alice will get j√2 j or j√2 j with equal
probability by the analysis above in Sec. III. However, the two
measured results in registers t1 and t2 may be different due
to the measurement’s randomness. Therefore, if Bob performs
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the entangle-and-measure attack, he might eventually succeed
but not with more than a 50% chance.
In a word, Alice in our improved QPQ protocol can find
the intercept-and-resend attack of a dishonest Bob with a
100% chance and the entangle-and-measure attack with a 50%
chance. That is, Alice can check the honesty of Bob with a 50%
chance, which is a strict bound for a cheat strategy. Similarly,
our improved QPQ protocol is also a cheat-sensitive quantum
protocol.

B. Bob’s privacy

As demonstrated in Ref. [3], Bob’s privacy (i.e., the
database security) is ensured by the finite number of signals
Bob is sending back to Alice. In our improved QPQ protocol, if
Alice is dishonest, she can send two different query subsystems
to Bob and further get two different query results [e.g., d(i)
and d(i ) ], but she will lose the ability to check the honesty
of Bob. Furthermore, a dishonest Alice can send a false query
|i instead of the true
state to Bob, e.g., a general state √1N

(−1)d(i) |i. Similarly,
extract one item d(i) from state √1N
if Alice performs this attack, she will also lose the chance to
check the honesty of Bob.
In addition, compared to the original QPQ protocol [3], our
improved QPQ protocol achieves the same communication
complexity, but it keeps better implementability of the phaseencoded QPQ protocol [4].
VI. CONCLUSION

We reexamine the security of the phase-encoded QPQ protocols and find that there is a security flaw in these protocols.
Furthermore, we give an improved cheat-sensitive QPQ protocol to overcome this flaw. Compared to the original QPQ protocols, the improved protocol does not lose any good feature.
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2
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